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Putting a Number on the Harm of Death 
Joseph Millum 
1. Introduction 
Donors to global health programs and policymakers within national health 
systems have to make difficult decisions about how to spend scarce health care 
dollars. These decisions are particularly pressing in the context of global health 
because the needs are so great relative to the available resources. In resource-
limited settings, for example, the decisions could include a choice between 
expanding the national immunization program to include new rotavirus vac-
cines, providing antiretroviral therapy to HIV-infected mothers and their chil-
dren, or investing in low-cost interventions to prevent stroke. All of these have 
the potential to save many lives at a relatively low cost, but they would save the 
lives of very different age groups. 
One important input to any principled decision-making process for health 
care priority setting is a measure of how effective different allocations of health 
care dollars would be. The measures of effectiveness currently used are usu-
ally summary measures of health.' These measures, which include Quality-
Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) and Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), are 
designed to provide a common measure of the disvalue (or value) of morbidity 
and mortality They therefore permit comparisons between different interven-
tions for different diseases. For example, they allow us to compare how bad it 
is to be blind with how bad it is to have epileptic seizures or be in chronic pain 
and to relate how bad these health states are to how bad it is to die. However, 
their construction requires that we assign specific numbers to the disvalue of 
people's deaths. Herein lies a challenge. 
'Throughout this chapter I discuss the construction of summary measures of health. It is very plau-
sible that this is not the appropriate measure of the effectiveness of health care interventions. My argu-
ments would apply equally well to the use of alternative measures, such as well-being. 
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Philosophers considering how bad it is to die have come to conflicting con-
clusions about the relative importance of the loss experienced by young chil-
dren who die compared with the loss experienced by adults who die. Some 
people think that the loss to infants matters much less than the loss to young 
adults (McMahan 2002; Persad et al. 2009). Others, including those who cur-
rently construct summary measures of health, take the opposite view (Murray 
et al. 2012). In the context of global health spending, this has the potential 
to make a huge difference to priority-setting decisions because young deaths 
constitute a large proportion of the global burden of disease. For example, 
according to the 2010 Global Burden of Disease data, nearly 800,000 new-
borns in sub-Saharan Africa die within the first week of life, around 2 million 
in total during the first year, and approximately another 1.2 million in the four 
years of life that follow (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2015). The 
relatively tiny number of newborns and young children who die within the 
European Union indicates that these deaths in sub-Saharan Africa are largely 
preventable. 
Given the number of deaths at very young ages, exactly which values we 
assign to the prevention of a death at a particular age may make a big dif-
ference to which interventions are considered cost-effective. In this chapter, 
I present one class of views about the disvalue of death—gradualist views—and 
consider the prospects for specifying them in a way that gives guidance about 
what values to assign. I argue that there are multiple ways to defend gradual-
ism, but even if we accept that gradualism is true, it is very hard to assign these 
values with as much accuracy as we might want. This is for three reasons: 
(1) there are different theories that entail gradualism; (2) the characteristics 
that are supposed to underlie what makes death bad for the decedent are 
underspecified by these theories; and (3) little attention has been given to the 
relative importance of these characteristics. Despite these problems, some values 
must be assigned. I close by tentatively suggesting key features of the most 
plausible function relating age and the disvalue of death. 
2. Starting Assumptions 
I start with three important assumptions. The first is the Termination 
Thesis: when I die, I cease to exist. By "I" here, I mean whatever it is about me 
that provides the basis for my mattering morally. We might argue about what 
I am essentially—a person, an organism, or an embodied mind (Johansson, 
chapter ii, this volume). Whatever it is, once it is permanently gone, I'm 
dead. Moreover, I make the secular assumption that when we say of someone 
that she is dead, that part of her is permanently gone. Second, I assume that 
some version of the Deprivation Account of what makes death bad is correct 
(Solberg, chapter 6, this volume). The Deprivation Account is the dominant 
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FIGURE 4.1. Disvalue of death: comparativism. 
view in the philosophical literature (Nagel 1970; Feldman 1991). According to 
this view, death is bad for the decedent because of what she misses out on 
by dying. If I get hit by a car tomorrow and die, this is bad for me because it 
means that I miss out on all the goods of life that I would have had were I to 
have stayed alive.2 
 Finally, and more controversially, I assume that some form 
of gradualism is probably correct. By gradualism, I mean the view that the 
characteristics that make death bad for the decedent are not wholly present at 
birth, but usually develop gradually over time. I say more about how to con-
ceptualize gradualism as I proceed. 
3. Current Practice 
Currently, for both QALYs and DALYs, it is assumed that death is bad for 
the decedent just in virtue of the amount of healthy life she misses out on by 
dying. This gives us a pretty straightforward relationship between age at death 
and the disvalue of that death. The older you are, the less you miss out on by 
dying, so the lower the disvalue (figure 4.1). The worst time to die is right after 
birth—this is when you miss out on the most life. I label this current, default 
2 The Deprivation Account has a number of advantages. First, it gives a plausible explanation of 
what makes death bad. Second, the explanation is not special to death—we can have a deprivation view 
of harm in general. Third, it allows us to say that some deaths are not bad for the decedent. In those 
cases in which the alternative to death is suffering, such that the bad aspects of being alive outweigh the 
good ones, it may be that death is good for the decedent, because of what she misses out on. Fourth, it 
will allow us to say how bad a death is. 
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FIGURE 4.3. Disvalue of death: gradualism. 
view comparativism. Right now comparativism is assumed by policymakers 
whenever they use QALYs or DALYs to help them make spending decisions. 
On a gradualist view, by contrast, the disvalue of losing some amount of 
future life gradually increases from some point in infancy or childhood as the 
person develops cognitively. Figure 4.2 plots the disvalue of losing future life 
against age for the gradualist with the highest value at I.' When we combine 
this view about the disvalue of losing future life with the amount of future life 
that is lost (which still diminishes with age), we get a curve relating the average 
disvalue of death to age that looks like that in figure 4.3. 
3 For the purposes of this chapter, I assume that it then remains at 1, although this isn't a given. 
4. Putting Gradualism into Practice 
I noted already that I am assuming that gradualism is correct. Even so, in order 
to assign numbers to the disvalue of different deaths, three key questions must 
be answered: 
(i) At what point does death start to be bad for the decedent, that is, 
in figures 4.2 and 4.3, where should we locate the intercept on the 
x-axis? 
(2) When does the disvalue of losing future life reach 1, that is, when 
does each year of lost life count fully? 
(3) What is the shape of the curve, that is, what function should we use 
to plot the points between the intercept on the x-axis and y = i in 
figure 4.2? 
To answer these questions, we need to know exactly what determines how bad 
theory that justifies gradualism. However, it turns out that multiple theories 
death is for an individual, which means that we need to look at the underlying 
could entail a gradualist view of the disvalue of death. 
First, there are theories according to which the basis for egoistic concern 
develops gradually, such as Jeff McMahan's Time-Relative Interest Account 
(TRIA) (McMahan 2002; chapter 8, this volume). Second, there are hierarchi-
cal accounts of people's interests (where someone's interests correspond to her 
well-being) according to which the interests that are frustrated or set back by 
death develop gradually. Third, there are developmental accounts of person-
hood, which are not about the disvalue of death per se but can be interpreted 
to have similar implications for allocation decisions. I now briefly go through 
these in turn. I then take two theories, which give some specifics about the 
characteristics that matter—McMahan's and Mary Anne Warren's—and see 
what we can glean from them about the form of the function relating age and 
the disvalue of losing future life. 
First, gradualists like McMahan think that someone has reason to care 
about herself over time only insofar as relations of prudential unity link her-
self now to herself in the future. The extent of these relations depends on the 
degree of psychological unity that holds between earlier and later stages of the 
person, where 
The degree of psychological unity within a life between times t, and t2 is 
a function of the proportion of the mental life that is sustained over that 
period [e.g., constant beliefs or dispositions], the richness or density of 
that mental life, and the degree of internal reference among the various 
earlier and later mental states. (McMahan 2002, 74-75) 
As this quotation suggests, the characteristics that supply psychological unity 
include memories, desires and intentions, self-awareness, and so on. These are 
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characteristics that fetuses and very young children—for the most part—do 
not possess but that develop gradually during infancy and childhood. Since 
psychological unity underlies prudential unity, the reasons that children have 
to care about their future selves also become stronger during normal develop-
ment. Consequently, as they develop, losing future life becomes worse for them. 
Second, a number of philosophers have accounts of interests that suggest 
that a person's interests in her future will develop gradually over time with 
cognitive development. If certain losses are possible only once someone has 
reached some stage of cognitive development or if the possible losses increase 
as someone develops a set of characteristics, then death will normally get 
worse as a child develops (Millum 2015, 5-7). For example, Peter Singer argues 
that self-conscious rational beings have interests in satisfying their prefer-
ences, over and above the interests that all sentient beings have in experiencing 
pleasure and avoiding pain. He writes: 
For preference utilitarians, taking the life of a person will normally be 
worse than taking the life of some other being, since persons are highly 
future-oriented in their preferences. To kill a person is therefore, nor-
mally, to violate not just one, but a wide range of the most central and 
significant preferences a being can have. Very often, it will make non-
sense of everything that the victim has been trying to do in the past days, 
months, or even years. (1993, 95) 
Other philosophers who have hierarchical views of interests include Joel 
Feinberg (1984, 42), Ronald Dworkin (1994, 204), and, in fact, McMahan 
(2002, 184) again. McMahan combines TRIA with a view according to which 
the frustration of desires for future goods, narrative unity, investment in one's 
future, and desert are all also relevant to how bad someone's death is for her. 
I return to this shortly. 
Third, assume that death is bad for the decedent in a sense relevant to prior-
ity setting only if the creature who dies is a person. This would be plausible if 
only persons have claims on the rest of us for a share of scarce resources. Now 
it might be that personhood is a binary concept, but we do not know exactly 
what characteristics entail that someone has acquired personhood or exactly 
when someone acquires them. Alternatively, there could be gradations of per-
sonhood as someone acquires more of the features that underlie it.4 Warren, 
when discussing the basis of the right to life, seems to take the first tack. She 
writes: 
It does seem reasonable to suggest that the more like a person, in the 
relevant respects, a being is, the stronger is the case for regarding it as 
'Compare Ben Bradley's Partial Welfare Subject View (chapter 9, this volume) according to which 
how bad death is for an individual depends on the degree to which she is a "well-being subject:'  
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having a right to life, and indeed the stronger its right to life is. Thus we 
ought to take seriously the suggestion that, insofar as "the human indi-
vidual develops biologically in a continuous fashion . . . the rights of a 
human person might develop in the same way." (1973, 43-61). 
If we had a view like Warren's, then we might model the increasing strength of 
the case for a being's having a claim on scarce resources by adopting a gradual-
ist view about the disvalue of death at young ages.' 
These argument sketches suggest that three different types of theory all may 
entail a gradualist view about the disvalue of death. Moreover, these routes 
to gradualism are not mutually exclusive, as McMahan's argument shows. 
Unfortunately, this convergence on gradualism is also a problem. Depending 
on which theory (or theories) are correct, the starting point, slope, and peak of 
the function relating age to the disvalue of death will be different. In fact, how 
we interpret the details of these theories will affect the shape of the function, 
too, and how to interpret them is very unclear. I now illustrate this point by 
going through some details of McMahan's and Warren's views. 
5. Putting Numbers on the Disvalue of Death: McMahan 
Two aspects of McMahan's account of what makes death bad for the dece-
dent have gradualist implications. The first aspect is the Time-Relative Interest 
Account, which is undergirded by the concept of the degree of psychologi-
cal unity between the individual who dies and her future interests. McMahan 
thinks that sentience is sufficient for some small degree of psychological unity, 
but it is much less than full-blown psychological unity. Along with sentience, 
according to McMahan, psychological unity increases as we get continuity of 
character or beliefs, desires, memories, self-awareness, and awareness of one's 
future (McMahan 2002, 170, 183). 
The non-TRIA characteristics that matter—that is, the characteristics that 
affect how bad death is for an individual but are not constituents of psycho-
logical unity—include narrative unity, the investment that an individual has 
made toward her future, desert, and desires for future goods.' For example, 
regarding narrative unity, McMahan writes: 
The importance of narrative unity helps to explain why the deaths of 
human fetuses and infants are less bad. It is only as a life progresses that 
'Either the claim or the reasonableness of asserting that a creature is a person will gradually 
increase over time. 
'McMahan (2002,183) also writes as though desires for future goods were a component of TRIA, so 
I am not sure exactly how to categorize them. However, for the sake of what I'm doing in this chapter, 
it should not matter. 
TABLE 4.1 1 McMahan and the Disvalue of Death 
Trail Age 
Psychological 
unity 
Non-TRIA (not 
constitutive of 
psychological 
unity) 
Sentience 
Beliefs, dispositions, memories 
Self-awareness: mirror test 
Self-awareness: embarrassment 
Awareness of temporally extended 
self 
Narrative unity 
Investment 
Desert 
Desires for future goods 
28 weeks' gestational age 
Increasing into mid-childhood 
18 months 
2 years 
3+ years 
Increasing into middle age? 
Increasing into middle age? 
Tracks investment 
Increasing into mid-childhood 
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These considerations suggest that constructing a function that relates age to 
the disvalue of death on the basis of McMahan's account is currently impos-
sible to do with precision. For the most part, we do not have conceptions of 
the relevant terms that allow us to map them onto what we know about child 
development. We do not know exactly which beliefs, dispositions, memories, 
desires, and so on matter, or how to aggregate them. And, crucially, we do 
not know the relative weight that should be given to each of these charac-
teristics. For example, how important is simple sentience as compared with 
self-awareness? 
6. Putting Numbers on the Disvalue of Death: Warren 
its story lines become more focused and determinate. And as the story of 
one's life becomes more defined, the narrative significance of succeeding 
events becomes increasingly important. (2002, 175-176) 
Table 4.1 lists the characteristics that matter, according to McMahan, and pro-
vides rough approximations for when those traits arise, on average, during 
normal development according to available data. 
Sentience, characterized at a minimum by the ability to feel pain, is proba-
bly present at around 28 weeks' gestational age.' When the relevant beliefs, dis-
positions, and memories arise depends on exactly which ones count and what 
relative importance they have. For instance, there are many very basic beliefs 
that we retain from early infancy—for example, about the location and limits 
of our bodies, object permanence, and family members—that are fundamental 
beliefs about ourselves and the world that remain throughout life. Likewise, 
some memories are essential to our lives, even when we cannot bring those 
memories into conscious experience. Consider, for example, what we have to 
remember in order to acquire the ability to walk or to speak a native language. 
So a great deal hangs on exactly what is taken to be necessary for psychologi-
cal unity. Similarly, when self-awareness arises depends on exactly what sort 
of self-awareness matters. If it is sufficient to recognize oneself in the mirror, 
then this appears around 18 months (Rochat 2003). Perhaps this is not the self-
awareness that is morally significant. By age 2, children experience emotions 
like embarrassment—implying that they understand themselves as objects of 
others' perceptions (Lewis 1992). By 3, children can identify themselves in pic-
tures and may understand that the photos were taken at different times; that is, 
they develop awareness of themselves as temporally extended (Povinelli 2001). 
Turn now to Warren. She was not writing about the harm of death, but she 
does present a list of the characteristics that plausibly constitute personhood, 
so her work provides a helpful case to illustrate the challenge for implementing 
gradualism.' She writes: 
I suggest that the traits that are most central to the concept of person-
hood. .. are, very roughly, the following: 
(1) Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the 
being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain; 
(2) Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively com-
plex problems); 
(3) Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of 
either genetic or direct external control); 
(4) The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an 
indefinite variety of types. . ; 
(5) The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual 
or racial, or both. (1973, 55) 
She goes on: "(1) and (2) alone may well be sufficient for personhood, and 
quite probably (1)-(3) are sufficient" 
We can attempt to date the characteristics that Warren considers important 
to personhood in the same way as with McMahan (table 4.2). 
Challenges of interpretation arise again as soon as we try to iden-
tify what provides solid evidence of the acquisition of the characteristics. 
Consciousness seems relatively straightforward if we interpret it as sen-
tience. Reasoning, which Warren describes as "the developed capacity to 
 
therefore do not impute to Warren the view that follows; rather it constitutes what someone 
who adopts her views about personhood might extrapolate from them in order to analyze the disvalue 
of death. For discussion, see Phillips and Millum (2015); Millum et al. (forthcoming). 
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TABLE 4.2 }Warren and the Disvalue of Death 
Consciousness and the 28 weeks' gestational age 
capacity to feel pain 
Reasoning 1 year: two-stage goal-directed actions 
2 years: object permanence, planned sequential acts 
3 years: use of visualization to solve tasks 
Self-motivated activity 1-2 months: focuses on people and objects, lifts self, rolls 
The capacity to 5 years'? 
communicate messages of 
an indefinite variety of types 
The presence of self-concepts 18 months: mirror test 
and self-awareness 3 years: race concepts (Quintana 1998) 
solve new and relatively complex problems," is trickier. At about age 1, chil-
dren can plan out two-stage actions (e.g., turn around spoon, grasp spoon) 
(Keen 2011). At 2, they have acquired object permanence and can engage 
in planned sequential acts. By 3, they can visualize the consequences of 
actions in order to problem-solve. Which, if any, constitutes a developed 
capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems? Similar challenges 
arise with the interpretation of self-motivated activity, communication, and 
self-concepts. 
7. Gaps, Uncertainty, and Our Best Approximation 
What lessons can we draw from this brief analysis? It suggests multiple gaps 
that we need to fill in order to confidently assign numbers to the disvalue of 
death at different ages in the construction of summary measures of health. 
First, since multiple theories would entail a gradualist view of the disvalue of 
death, we are faced with uncertainty about which view is correct. Second, we 
lack precise descriptions of the characteristics that the defenders of these dif-
ferent views think matter. The lack of precision entails that it is very challeng-
ing to identify indicators that would tell us whether those characteristics are 
present. Third, no one suggests how to weight the characteristics that matter 
against one another—for example, how we should weigh the relative impor-
tance of self-awareness versus narrative unity. 
Nevertheless, we do not have the option of not assigning values. If we are 
going to use summary measures of health (or well-being) in priority setting, 
and if those measures will include the loss due to mortality as well as mor-
bidity, then they will incorporate some view of the relationship between the 
disvalue of death and age. I end this chapter with a tentative proposal for the  
key features of the function that I think we should use in the face of all this 
uncertainty. 
I base my proposal on the following guiding principles. First, only beings 
capable of sentience have deaths that are bad for them. I think the arguments 
against nonsentient beings having a welfare are compelling and do not rely 
on controversial premises. We should take sentience as a necessary condition 
for a death to be bad for the decedent. Second, in allocating scarce resources, 
we should adopt what I call an anti-snobbery principle: it is not significantly 
worse for a hyperactive intellectual to die than an unemployed couch potato. 
Relatedly, we should be wary of assuming that death is particularly bad for 
creatures like us—adult human academics—by virtue of the traits that dis-
tinguish us from other people or creatures. Third, we need to take our uncer-
tainty about the right view and the relevant characteristics into account. 
Taking these guiding principles into account, I propose the following:9 
(1) Death should be regarded as bad for the decedent starting from 
28 weeks' gestational age. This is a reasonable approximation to 
the onset of sentience, which I suggested is a necessary condition 
for death to be bad for the creature that dies. There are theoretical 
and intuitive reasons for thinking that just being sentient is also 
sufficient for us to regard a fetus as experiencing some loss from 
dying. Accounts like TRIA provide theoretical reasons; for example, 
McMahan (2002, 79) thinks that we get some psychological 
continuity once we get a consistent subject of experiences, and 
so this will ground some egoistic concern about the loss of future 
life. Intuitively, many people think it's bad for the fetus to die, even 
though they don't think it's as bad as the death of someone older.1° 
(2) We should plot a smooth curve (as illustrated in figure 4.3). 
A smooth curve is one way to deal with the many possible sources 
of uncertainty. It might be true that the disvalue of death for an 
individual increases in steps, rather than smoothly increasing. 
However, there is no way we are currently clear enough on the 
empirical facts and normative principles to locate the steps with 
confidence. 
(3) The disvalue of losing future life should reach 1 (its highest value) 
by age 5. If we don't have the peak by this age, then we risk violating 
Compare the set of values proposed by Andreas Mogensen (chapter 3, this volume) For Mogensen, 
most of the characteristics that matter are acquired in early childhood, even though the disvalue of los-
ing future life will not finally reach one until around 18 years of age. 
m Consider the controversy following Giubilini and Minerva's (2012) article on what they called 
"after-birth abortion." They argued that similarities between newborn infants and late-stage fetuses 
implied that we should treat them similarly. If it was permissible to kill one, then it was permissible to 
kill another. Commentators in the popular media were outraged. 
72 1  Joseph Millum 
the anti-snobbery principle. By age 5, normally developing children 
have had desires, memories, and self-consciousness for some time. 
They understand the past, present, and future and the fact that 
they persist through time. They have close and varied relationships 
with others. They have enduring interests (and may have interests 
that endure for the rest of their lives, such as in music, dance, or 
sports). They have a broad emotional palette and may have some 
understanding of and fear of death (Kliegman et al. 2on.; Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 2012). To show that 5-year-
olds do not have what it takes, a gradualist would have to defend 
the inclusion of a characteristic that 5-year-olds lack but is both 
very important for the loss of one's future to matter to one and is 
possessed by most healthy adults. Philosophers are fond of citing 
long-term projects (like writing books) and life plans (like raising 
families). But do we really want to say that people whose projects 
are more short-term and whose life plans are more changeable have 
deaths that are significantly less bad (Gamlund 2016)? 
(4) The function should be close to its peak by 18-24 months. It 
seems clear why characteristics like future-directed mental states 
and a conception of oneself would be relevant to whether losing 
future life would count as a loss for the individual. Not having a 
conception of oneself as a creature (and a creature with a future and 
a past) makes it challenging to see why going out of existence would 
be personally bad. Most of the writers whose views seem as though 
they would entail gradualism also mention such characteristics. 
My confidence that more sophisticated cognitive abilities make 
a substantial difference to how bad it is to die is much lower. We 
must make a trade-off here: we must balance the risk of overvaluing 
the saving of young lives with the risk of undervaluing it. I propose 
that we err in favor of the former. The chance that a 2-year-old has 
everything that it takes for death to be bad for her seems to me 
much higher than the chance that she has nothing or little of what 
makes death bad for someone. 
8. Objections 
Several writers, including McMahan, believe that the worst time to die is later 
than I have suggested (McMahan 2002; Persad et al. 2009; Dworkin 1994). 
They think that it falls sometime in adolescence or early adulthood. Two of the 
characteristics from McMahan's list—narrative unity and investment—might 
justify this view if they make a substantial difference to how bad it is to die. 
McMahan thinks that narrative unity increases with age: "It is only as a life 
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progresses that its story lines become more focused and determinate" (2002, 
176). And the longer one lives, the more, all else being equal, one can invest in 
one's life and so have wasted when it does not come to fruition. However, I do 
not think that either implies that it is worse to die as an adolescent or a young 
adult than as a 5-year-old. 
First, consider the claim that the loss from dying to infants and young chil-
dren is lower as a result of the greater narrative unity of older children's and 
adults' lives. Distinguish two reasons why someone might think that having 
one's life narrative interrupted makes one worse off. We might think that a life 
with narrative unity is better than one without. But if this is the right way to 
interpret what is bad about an interrupted narrative, then someone who dies 
without starting a narrative, and therefore does not have a life containing nar-
rative unity, is at least as badly off in that respect as someone whose narrative 
has begun and been cut off. Alternatively, it might be claimed that having a 
narrative and having it interrupted is worse than having no narrative at all. 
But someone who makes this claim owes us an explanation of why we should 
think that infants and young children haven't started their narratives. After all, 
we might naturally start our life stories with our births, and early life experi-
ences may both have substantial effects on our lives and be considered highly 
relevant to their meaning. For example, many adoptees consider the facts sur-
rounding their adoption an important part of their life story. 
Second, consider the relevance of investment to the loss incurred by dying." 
Here the claim is that someone who has invested in her life and then not reaped 
the rewards of that investment is thereby made worse off than someone who 
did not even have the opportunity to invest. I find this implausible. By analogy, 
would we say that someone who had money to invest in the stock market and 
lost it all was worse off than someone who never had money to invest? The 
former might feel more regret, but that is not what is at issue—we have to hold 
all else equal, so the disappointment that the investor feels does not count." 
9. Conclusions 
Priority setting using summary measures of health or well-being requires that 
we put numbers on the disvalue of death
, 
 at different ages. Uncertainty about 
"Since desert, in the sense that McMahan seems to mean it, likely tracks investment, my skepti-
cism about the relevance of investment should entail similar skepticism about the relevance of desert. 
u Certainly, at least, some people are pulled by the opposite intuition: that it is worse to never 
even have had the chance to invest in one's future. Consider Tennyson's much-cited couplet from In 
Memorium: 
'Tis better to have loved and lost 
Than never to have loved at all. 
• josepii ivunum 
empirical facts and normative principles makes this challenging. The avail-
able theories suffer from (1.) uncertainty about the correct account of the dis-
value of death; (2) a lack of precision about the characteristics that matter and 
appropriate indicators for them; and (3) no discussion of relative weights of 
the characteristics that matter. I have presented some key features of the best 
approximation I can provide of the correct function relating age and the dis-
value of death, given the theories in play and some opinions about the plausi-
bility of the considerations they mention. 
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